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Patrizia Violil
1. Is there any such thing called cognitive
semiotics ?
I have started this article with a provocative question, which may
sound even more provocative in a special issue devoted to Cognitive
Semiotics. However, if we look more closely at the general area of
semiotic research often referred to as Cognitive Semiotics, we find so
many different approaches and such a variety and diversity of
conceptions and methodologies that this makes it very difficult to
speak of a unitary discipline.
Cognitive Semiotics ought to emerge at the crossroads between
Semiotics and Cognitive Science. However, the complex relationship
between these two disciplines has followed a problematic, and in
some sense paradoxical, path, since they seem at the same time too
close and too distant from one another.
Viewed from a peircian perspective, the designation “cognitive
semiotics” appears a tautological definition, since cognition and
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semiosis relate to exactly the same phenomenon, and thus overlap
completely.
On the other hand, the structuralist tradition in semiotics has
always been pervaded by a well diffused mistrust of any form of
psychologism : since anti-mentalism was the dominant position, this
brought with it a widespread rebuttal of any kind of work on cognitive
aspects of semiotic processes. The issue of whether or not such a
position depends on a much too restrictive idea of what cognition can,
or may be, is a different matter altogether, and one which I will not
concern myself with in this present article.
Today, however, a concomitant shift in the two paradigms is
allowing, and demanding, a reframing of this question, and opens up,
in my opinion, some interesting common ground for further
investigation. Such an investigation could, if successful, very well
contribute to producing a more appropriate framework for a Cognitive
Semiotics.
What I will argue in this paper is that such a framework can be
developed only if the crucial issue of the body and its role, not only in
cognition, but also in meaning processes in general is placed at the
centre of focus for the new field. The shift towards an embodied
approach to the issues mentioned above is already in the air, although,
as I intend to claim, some further qualifications will be necessary in
order to develop it fully.
In the last 15 years, within the particular sub-fields of Cognitive
Science that go under the name of Cognitive Linguistics and
Cognitive Semantics, the concept of embodiment has certainly
become more and more popular, perhaps even too much so.
In the same period and in a parallel way, European semiotics also
started investigating a related set of problems connected with the role
of feelings, emotions, and sensory and perceptual elements —in a
word : the embodied dimensions of meaning. Today, the “corporeal
turn” seems to characterize many different disciplines, all concerned
in one way or another with language, meaning and cognition,
although such a turn may well have followed different trajectories and
positions. Where in cognitive approaches the body is often considered
in terms of its neuro-physiological dimensions, in the post structuralist
semiotics what is at stake is not only the body with its sensory-motor
devices, but also the emotions and feelings that animate it.
However important such differences may be, the need for a
better understanding and confrontation between these two main
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traditions is generally recognized. Fontanillel claims, for example,
that a semiotics oriented toward the analysis of sensitivity and
‘sensitive modes’ cannot develop while ignoring the current state of
cognitive research. Here he makes reference to the work of Varela,
Thompson, Roschz and their concept of “enaction”, which is an
embodied action. In what follows I would like to investigate some of
the basic tenets of embodied cognition, and look at some possible
links with a more semiotically oriented approach. I would like to
claim the following: i) there are today within the field of cognitive
studies many very different notions of embodiment, only some of
which are of real theoretical interest from a semiotic perspective. It is
therefore crucial to distinguish among them in order to specify which
type of conception of embodiment is most productive for cognitive
semiotics; ii) embodiment is related in an important way to the
problem of meaning processes, and it can help in a decisive way to
reframe some of the most controversial questions in semantics. A
context oriented, encyclopedic approach to meaning, which semiotics
intrinsically offers, needs to take into account the role of the body; iii)
the notion of ‘body’ is not a self-evident nor simple one, as is too
often assumed in contemporary Cognitive Science; on the contrary
the body is a constructed concept, and as such, cannot be reduced to
purely neuro-physiological aspects nor to the brain. The kind of body
that needs to be incorporated into Cognitive Semiotics is a
phenomenological one, allowing us to open up for the central issue of
subjectivity. Only given these basic conditions can embodiment come
to represent a relevant contribution to cognitive semiotics.
But it is now time to have a closer look to what is exactly meant
by “embodiment”, and how it might constructively be related to a
more specifically oriented semiotic approach.
2. The various forms of embodiment
In very general terms we could say that the main idea behind
embodiment is that mind derives and takes shape from the fact that we
1 J. FON'E‘ANlLLE, “Polisensorialite e autonomia della dimensione figurative”, in
P. BASSO, L. CORRAIN (eds.), Eloqnio del senso. Dialoghi S€ﬂ'Il0llCl per Paolo
Fabbri, Milano, Costa e Nolan, 1999.
2 F. VARELA, E. THOMPSON, E. ROSCH, The Embodied Mind, Cambridge, Mass., MIT
Press, 1991.
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have a body that interacts with our environment. Such an assumption
is generally seen as drastically opposed to classic representational
cognitivism, which is based on functionalism and the computer-mind
metaphor. According to functionalism, mind is independent from its
material implementation, as the computer-mind metaphor suggests.
Implicitly connected to this position is a theory of concepts and
semantic categories which is generally referred to as the “classic”
theory, where it is claimed that it is possible to arrive at a precise
definition of the semantic categories over and above, and
independently from, their uses and contexts of application. In this
perspective the body does not play an important role : it is essentially
an output device, as often defined, merely executing commands
generated in the mind through symbol manipulation.
In the embodied perspective, on the other hand, cognition is seen
as depending in an fundamental way on the body and its perception
and motor systems, as well as on bodily based experience and our
interactions with the world.
Before going on to discuss these matters, we must immediately
point out that there is no such thing as a unique theory of
embodiment. On the contrary, the concept of embodiment is a very
polysemic one, and different authors use it in quite different ways.
Rather than referring to a single theory of embodiment, we ought to
refer to different theories of embodiment, often highly divergent from
one another, and sometimes having very little in common.
So let us now return to the issue of what might be considered the
basic idea underlying the various approaches to embodiment. What
exactly does it mean to say that the mind is embodied, and that it
emerges and derives from the body ? If we look more closely, we can
see that there are many different readings of this same thesis, ranging
from an extremely weak one to an extremely strong one, which is
theoretically more interesting, but also more controversial. It will
certainly prove useful to examine these various positions more
closely, since only some of them will turn out to be of interest from a
semiotic point of view.
A first, extremely weak interpretation would simply imply that
all cognitive processes have a material basis. This is such a generic
option that it would be difficult to disagree, but at same time it is so
generic that it is not very meaningful. A more interesting assumption
would be to say that cognitive processes cannot not have a material
basis or, in other words, that cognition is directly connected to the
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various structures and biological processes that implement it. A
somewhat similar version, still rather weak, implies that in order to
understand mental processes one cannot ignore the way the nervous
system and the brain work. In the last few decades, both neuroscience
and neuropsychology have made such a position highly popular, and
also widely accepted : today there are probably very few researchers
in cognitive science who would disagree with it, with perhaps the
exception of few more orthodox functionalists. From a semiotic point
of view, however, this appears to be somehow a more background
type of issue, since a semiotic analysis is not directly concerned with
these more basic levels of description, but rather with the higher
levels of sense organization.
A third interpretation, defined as “material” embodiment‘, also
takes into account —in addition to the idea that the mind depends on
underlying neurobiological processes-— the constraints imposed on
cognition by real-time bodily actions performed by an agent in a real
environment.
This is a quite popular position today in robotics, where research
is focused on low-level cognitive tasks such as visual scanning or
motion. Since it has to deal with the construction of robots able to
perform real actions in a real environment, robotics must necessarily
develop models of vision, perception and movement constrained by
genuine perceptual-motor interactions with the environment.
Here embodiment means essentially taking into account the
spatial-temporal constraints implicit in real bodies, but it does not
imply any strong theoretical assumptions. Lakoff and Johnson?
distinguish here between embodiment as realization and embodiment
as shaping. 0
Embodiment as shaping, often defined as full embodiment, or
radical embodied cognition, is certainly the more popular position in
contemporary cognitive semantics, and appears to be the one we
should look at more closely from a semiotic point of view. According
to this view, all concepts, even the most abstract ones such as those of
mathematics3 are the result “of the way the brain and body are
l R. NUNEZ, “Could the future taste purple '? Reclaiming mind, body and cognition”,
Journal of Cozmsciosenss Studies, 6, n° ll-12, 1999, pp. 41-60.
2 G. LAKOFF and M. JOHNSON, Philosophy in the Flesh, New York, Basic Books,
1999.
3 Cf. G. LAKOFF and R. NUNEZ, Where Mathematics Comes from: How the
Embodied Mind Creates Mathemathics, New York, Basic Books, 2000.
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structured and the way they function in interpersonal relations and in
the physical world”1.
Notice that in this quote from Lakoff and Johnson, brain and
body are used as substantially interchangeable ; this kind of
overlapping is quite consistently found in many fields of research on
embodiment. According to Nunez for example, embodiment explains
concepts “in terms of the non-arbitrary bodily experiences sustained
by the peculiarities of brains and bodies”?
This is a crucial question, since there is a potential ambiguity in
considering body and brain as equivalents —an ambiguity that could
produce potentially dangerous levels of confusion. Body and brain are
not the same thing, as the phenomenological tradition, both of Husserl
and of Merleau-Ponty, has taught us, a tradition to which most
researchers today seem to refer. So this would seem to be a vital issue
if we want to incorporate an embodied approach in a serious way into
a cognitively oriented semiotics.
The body is something quite different from the brain, and if the
latter can be seen as an immediate object for scientific study, the body
certainly is not, in any direct and transparent way. Indeed, I would
like to make the opposite claim, i.e. that the body is not at all a self-
evident concept as it might appear at a first sight. I will come back to
this point later.
For the moment I just want to make salient one specific
ambiguity of this kind which underlies most work on embodiment.
While material embodiment refers to the properties of the brain, and
therefore the body in this model may be described as a body-brain,
when we are speaking of embodied concepts or embodied cognition, a
quite different meaning of “body” is at stake, much closer to the
notion of “corporeal schema” than to that of the brain. Although
embodied cognition might well have a neural plane of
implementation, we have here two different levels of description,
which do not coincide, and it would be helpful to keep them apart.
Semiotics, with its phenomenological tradition, might very well play
an important role in clarifying these issues and distinguishing between
these two conceptual levels, of which only the second is, as I have
already mentioned, of real semiotic concern.
[\Jv—- PU?)
LAKOFF and M. JOHNSON, Philosophy in the Flesh, op. cit., p. 37.
NONEZ, op. cit., p. 56.
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Within the field of Cognitive Science, the picture is even more
complicated, however, since the new paradigm is pursued within
different disciplines and by means of different methodological
approaches, which do not all necessarily share the assumptions of
cognitive linguistics, not to mention those of semiotics.
To simplify, three main research domains relevant for our
present discussion might be designated : connectionism (and neo-
connectionism), robotics, and cognitive semantics, which is certainly
the closest in spirit to cognitive semiotics. Each of these domains does
not necessarily share the same notion of embodiment with the two
others.
For example, many of the neo-connectionist models which use a
dynamic modelling approach are not at all necessarily embodied, in
the sense of having systematic, continuous relations with their actual
perception and motor referents. What we have here is rather a
conceptual interpretation which has little to do with empirical
perceptive states, as Prinz and Barsalou have shown‘. Connectionist
nets do not guarantee embodiment, neither the radical embodiment of
cognitive semantics, nor the weaker material embodiment.
Situated robotics, on the other hand, as I have already pointed
out, has necessarily to take into account actual bodily constraints,
since, in order to be fully operative the cognitive system underlying a
robot must have an efficient interface with perception and action
data : a simple abstract computing system would not be sufficient.
Maybe the main lesson we can derive from situated robotics is
that to perform perception and action we cannot use only the
cognitive system in itself, we need also to exploit the resources
inherent in the body and the environment. As Clark? claims,
intelligence is not based exclusively on cognitive abilities —-it evolves
from the dynamic interaction between brain, body and world.
The concept of embodiment used in situated robotics is also
different from the one used in the more theoretical fields of cognitive
semantics and contemporary cognitive semiotics, which are crucially
concerned with embodied experience. Both cognitive semantics and
I J. PRINZ and L. BARSALOU, “Steering a course for Embodied Representation”, in
E. DEETRICH, A.B. MARKMAN (eds.), Cognitive Dynamics: Conceptual and
Representational Change in Humans and Machines, New Jersey, Lawrence
Erlbaum, 2000.
2 A. CLARK, Being There : Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again, Boston
MA, MIT Press, I997.
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semiotics see human experience as fundamentally bodily based:
concepts and cognition emerge from our experience and are bodily
grounded.
To conclude, there are probably more differences than
similarities among researchers who explicitly refer to the notion of
embodiment. For some, the “embodied” mind is still computational in
a literal way, for others is not computational at all. Some refute
completely the concept of representation, generally preferring
dynamic systems, others, like Barsalou, refute dynamic systems and
still use forms of representation. For some, embodiment exists only in
authentically living systems (and not in simulations, not even
connectionist ones), for others this is irrelevant ; finally for cognitive
semantics and semiotics the crucial idea is that of phenomenological
bodily experience.
What then do all these different approaches have in common '?
Well, probably the only real unifying aspect to be found is a critical
one.
Embodiment theories are essentially a critical reaction to
representational cognitivism, and in particular Fodor’s functionalism.
Here, there are two points of criticism : first, the non consideration of
body-based ‘material’ aspects of cognition ; second, the reduction of
cognitive processes to purely syntactic symbolic manipulation.
From this point of view, theories of embodiment appear to be a
natural development of cognitive semantics and cognitive linguistics
of the seventies and eighties. Theoretical antecedents can be traced
back to cognitive grammars, especially Space Grammar and Mental
Space theory‘ ; research on space and language? and Force Dynamics,
the system of forces that tTalmy3 posits as the ground of the linguistic
system of modality, which is essentially derived from embodied
structuring.
i Cf. R. LANGACKER, Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, Stanford, Stanford
University Press, 1986 ; G. FAUCONNIER, Mental Spaces: Aspects of Meaning
Construction in Natural Languages, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1985.
2 See, among stothers L. TALMY, “How Language Structures Space”, in H. PICK and
L. ACREDOLO (eds.), Spatial Orientation : Theory, Research and Application, New
York, Plenum Press, I983.
3 L. TALMY, “Force Dynamics in Language and Thought”, Papers from the
Parasession Caasatives and Agentivity, Chicago, Chicago Linguistic Society, 1985.
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A fundamental antecedent is also to be found in the critical
review of the classical category theory that goes under the generic
name of prototype theory‘.
Since these seminal works first arrived, research in this field has
continued to advance, reframing in a radical way some of its key
concepts, beginning with that of representation.
3.. Body and situated meaning
The representational issue is one of central concem for cognitive
semiotics: at a first sight it might appear highly problematic to assume
a strong anti-representational stance, as it is often the case within the
field of research based on embodiment in the Anglo—American
cognitive tradition. How could we possibly go without representations
while the very notion of sign is nothing but a way to represent
something by means of something else, according to Peirce?
However, if we look more closely, the basic controversy appears to
have been developed in a slightly different way. The anti-
representational controversy is more properly a controversy against a
particular type of representation: symbolic representation, in the
fodorian sense. Such a criticism, as we will see, is not at all
contradictory to basic semiotic tenets, rather quite the opposite.
Roschz for example claims there is a need to distinguish between
two types of representation: the first is a device that mediates
between mind and world, close to Peirce’s idea of semiosis,
connecting the external and internal worlds ; the second is based on a
notion used in classical cognitivism, where symbols are seen as
syntactic symbols --formal operations within the closed system of a
machine (or a mind, which is nothing but a machine).
One of the most important differences between these two models
is the different ways they offer to look at context. Traditional
cognitive science sees representations as stable, context-insensitive
configurations that cannot be affected by contextual change. The so-
called classical theory of categories was based on precisely such an
i It is impossibile to provide even a very concise bibliography on this topic. For a
critical reading of the theory, see P. VIOLI, Meaning and Experience, Bloomington,
Indiana University Press, 2001.
2 E. ROSCH, “Reclaiming Concepts”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, n° l1~l2,
1999, pp. 61-77.
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assumption: a category might be a node, a network, a set of features,
or a mental world, but was in any case always a static and immutable
entity. In other words the basic idea was that one and the same
invariant structure represents one particular concept in all possible
contexts.
Now such a conception of the matter seems highly problematic :
there is little doubt that natural cognitive systems exhibit a high
degree of variety, and that our functioning in the world is much more
ﬂexible than any fixed structure could describe. Both our behaviours
and our mental states adapt continuously to changing contexts,
responding in a highly ﬂexible way to environmental modifications.
The traditional concept of representation thus turns out to be radically
inadequate.
This is not something new in Semiotics: similar criticisms of the
classical theory of representation have been developed within a
semiotic perspective since the seventies. Umberto Eco in his A Theory
of Semiotics (l976)* has already pointed out the fundamental
incapacity of any kind of invariant, dictionary~like structure to
represent meaning, and successively, in 19842, he further elaborated
the general notion of the encyclopedia as the only viable alternative to
dictionary based models. From this point of view semiotic
perspectives, at least those developed within a peircian interpretative
framework, and those of cognitive semantics based on prototype
theory are certainly highly compatible, as I have discussed elsewhere-l.
At this point, however, my thesis is that developing the issue of
embodiment can help us go even further and develop a more
sophisticated approach to meaning and semiosis, and their relation to
context, an approach that is theoretically more radicalthan that
presupposed in Eco’s models.
Concepts are indeed sensitive to contexts because we are
embodied organisms and we interact with the environment.
Embodiment and interaction are basic features of our semantic
system, and more generally, of the ways in which we make sense of
all our ongoing experience.
Taking embodiment seriously in describing meaning can help a
semiotic approach to overcome some of the limitations that can still
l Cfr. U. ECO, A Theory of Semiotics, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1976.
2 U. ECO, Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, Bloomington, Indiana
University Press, 1984.
3 P. VIOLI, Meaning and Experience, op. cit.
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be found in the encyclopedic model. Indeed the concept of
encyclopedia, as elaborated by Eco, is a cultural construct that can
account in terms of a regulative hypothesis for all possible cultural
and social components of meaning, but has considerably less to say
regarding the phenomenological side of our experience, although it
does not in principle exclude it.
I believe that if something such as a cognitive semiotics is to be
established as a field of study, it cannot avoid the incorporation of
embodiment in its basic definition of cognition, and indeed the very
taking of this incorporation of embodiment as its starting point.
Among the various embodied approaches we can already find
some interesting suggestions in this particular direction.
Rosch, for example, emphasizes the role of situation and context
in an embodied perspective. According to Rosch‘ even when concepts
appear to be universal and abstract, they always refer to specific and
concrete situations. Real situations are events rich in information and
should be the real object of study. Generally speaking, psychology
tends to see contextual effects as negative elements that invalidate
experimental work, but this perspective should be changed, and
variations should become the main data for analysis.
Interestingly enough, the adoption of a strong contextualism of
this kind parallels some recent positions in semiotics, where focus has
been shifted from the system, and therefore from structural
regularities, to process and text. The textual turn in semiotics implies
making, and considering the text as a the real unit of analysis ; this is
compatible with Rosch’s positions, where the single situation is
considered to be the correct object of analysis. In both approaches we
can find a common holistic component, which in some semiotic
approaches appears to be extremely radicalizedz.
Today, Rosch’s broader assumptions regarding representations
and the nature of concepts are quite different from her previous work
on prototypes, and are embedded in a strongly holistic idea of the
mind-world whole. Concepts are now seen as intrinsically non-
representational : they do not have the function of representing the
world in the mind, nor do they mainly have an identifying function, as
1 E. ROSCH, “Reclaiming Concepts”, op. cit.
2 Cf. F. RASTIER, M. CAVAZZA, A. ABEiLLE, Sémantique pour Panaiyse. De la
linguistique ti l’inf0rmatiq.ue, Paris, Masson, 1994.
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is generally taken for granted in experimental research on naming
tasks. Rather, concepts participate in situations.
“Concepts and categories do not represent the world in the mind,
they are a participating part of the mind-world whole”'. Their
participative nature derives from their being a natural mediation
between mind and world, a mediation which is necessarily anchored
into specific and locally defined situations. “Concepts are the natural
bridge between mind and world to such an extent that they require us
to change what we think of as mind and what we think of as world ;
concepts occur only in actual situations in which they function as
participating parts of the situation rather than either as representations
or as mechanisms for identifying objects”?
Even those who do not share such a radical position would agree
not to conceive of representations primarily as structures that
represent the external world, but rather as control structures for the
regulation of interactions with the external world. This shift from
mirror or encoding models to action-device models is quite common
in current research on embodiment.
In robotics for example, Clark describes representations as
control structures : “The idea here is that the brain should not be seen
primarily as a locus of inner descriptions of external states of affairs ;
rather, it should be seen as a locus of inner structures that act as
operators upon the world via their role in determining actions”3.
Representations become here oriented toward action, while at the
same time describing aspects of the world and prescribing possible
actions, in a fine balance between pure control structures and passive
representations of the external world.
It is worth noticing how much an approach of this kind to the
issue of representation is close to the basic tenets of Peirce’s
pragmaticism. For the American philosopher too, concepts (and
representations) are always correlated with actions: while concepts,
seen as habits of mind, have a regulative function in relation to the
internal world, stabilizing the process of unlimited semiosis, on the
other hand when operative as beliefs, they also constitute the basis for
behavioral and communicative habits, which are nothing but
regularities in actions. In this way the very same semiotic structures
1 E. ROSCH, op. cit, p. 72.
2 lbid., p. 61.
3 A. CLARK, Being There, op. cit, p. 47.
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regulate both the internal world of concepts and beliefs and the
external world of actions, acting as a bridging system between the
two.
A similar idea can be found in the model for memory proposed
by Glenbergl, where memory does not primarily have a representative
function “to store the past”, but is rather an embodied device for
facilitating interactions with the environment.
Such a perspective, largely shared among embodiment theorists,
focuses on the role of the larger environment and its interactions with
the organism, and on the relation between external and internal
worlds. This explains a growing interest in Gibson? and his concept of
ajffordances. For Gibson too, representations and internal states that
mediate the relationship with external world, are centred on action, or,
to use Gibson’s words, connected to affordances. Affordances are
nothing more than possibilities for action and use offered by the local
environment to a particular type of embodied agent, equipped with
specific bodily features. In this way perception is always
contextualized and constructed : the world is essentially perceived by
some given organism endowed with its own intentions in some given
context, and is seen as affording opportunities for goal directed
actions. Perception is therefore always connected to action, and both
perception and action are always connected to cognition.
This is a crucial point, because the action~perception-cognition
link is perhaps one of the most important acquisitions of embodiment
theories. Perception is never seen as a passive recording of
information, but is immediately connected to action potentials.
Therefore any kind of rigid distinction between perception and
cognition disappears, and they become highly integrated and
overlapping processes. Not surprisingly, such an approach is very
interested in results of neuro-physiological studies that show a
connection, even at neuronal level, between perception, action,
thought and imagination. Recent research on mirror neurons have
shown that in primates, and also in humans, the same neurons fire
both when a given action (like grasping a cup of coffee) is effectively
executed by some individual, and when it is observed while being
executed by an other, and as well as when the subject merely thinks of
1 A. GLENBERG, “What Memory is For”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 11° 20,
1997, pp. l-55.
2 J.J. GIBSON, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Boston, Houghton
Mifflin, 1979.
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executing it. Interestingly enough, this does not happen just for any
kind of movement, only for intentional actions, finalized to a goal
(such as grasping a cup), and thus only for intentional interactions
with the environment, or, to use Gibson’s words: interactions
connected to precise affordances.
The existence of underlying schemas common to perception,
action, language and cognition probably represents one of the most
challenging acquisitions of work on embodiment, and it is one that
cognitive semiotics cannot ignore, since it implies a highest possible
level of integration between all these systems. Perception, action,
language cannot any more be considered as totally autonomous and
independent modules, they must become functional specifications in a
common unitary configuration.
This is also the ground of metaphorical concepts, so central in
cognitive semantics, in that they represent linguistic and conceptual
projections of bodily configurations of various kinds (perceptual,
motor, spatial, and so on).
Metaphorical projections are always motivated; this is the
second important lesson we can derive from embodiment studies.
Together with the motivational aspect, this offers a radical challenge
to the dominant view of language as a formal system, totally arbitrary
and abstract. An important consequence of this work is a shift from
the study of linguistic forms to the study of linguistic substances, a
shift fully shared by contemporary cognitive semiotics. As Petitot
suggests :
Il s’agit d’abord de rompre avec Fidéalisme semiotique a
l’oeuvre dans les approches formalistes du sens qui auront
dominé la grande période du structuralisme logico-
combinatoire‘.
Idealistic formalism has several important consequences : first of
all it implies a totally disembodied approach to meaning : “Le sens
perd tout rapport an monde naturel externe et au couplage perception-
action qui fonde notre rapport écologique et éthologique a ce monde”?
Secondly, meaning is deprived of all self-organizing systemic
principles and cannot but be purely logical and combinatory .
1 J . PETITOT, “Les nervures du marbre. Remarques sur le “socle dur de l’étre” chez
Umberto Eco, in J. PETITOT et P. FABBRI, Au nom dz: sens. Amour de l’rez-¢v1'e
d’Umberr0 Eco, Paris, Grasset, 2000, p. 84.
2 1:;-111., p. s5.
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A cognitive semiotics based on embodiment should pursue a
double program that we could define at one and the same time as a de-A
formalisation and a de-menralisation of meaning and sense,
reintroducing the study of substance as an essential part of its project.
4. Which body for cognitive semiotics ?
The new field of embodiment has brought to light many
interesting concepts and questions of central concern for a cognitive
semiotics : firstly, there is a more realistic idea of the way human
beings perceive and interact with their environment, and the way in
which meaning emerges from these activities. Secondly, there is the
interconnection between cognition, perception, and action ; the crucial
relevance of situations and contexts, and a different and more
articulated idea of the relationship between external and internal
world. Finally, there is the central role of embodied structures in
language and cognition, and the embodied nature of metaphorical
mappings. All this points to a contextualist and pragmaticist
conception of semiosis, in the peircian tradition, allowing an anti-
idealisitic and anti-formalistic shift in semiotics, such as the one
advocated by Petitot. Embodiment allows and indeed requires a
superceding of the purely logical and formal approach which had
characterized semiotic structuralism in its initial period of
development; meaning ceases to be a purely negative value, as it has
been conceived in the saussurian tradition, but also acquires a living
connection with our perceptional, phenomenological and emotional
experience of the world. In this way world, experience, body and
mind will all come to be seen as much more closely interconnected
and strictly related to one another than before‘.
These are all very important acquisitions, but however, there are
still a few points which will need to be more carefully considered, and
where I believe that semiotics will be able to contribute an important
series of clarifications to the wider study of embodiment.
The first concept in need of a better understanding and
clarification is, paradoxically, the very notion of “body”. Body is
often taken as a “natural” concept, and one which does not need any
1 On this point see P. COPPOCK, “Semiotics and the body: C.S.Peirce on the mind—
body-world relation”, Versus. Qnaderni di smdi semiorici.
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further elaboration. Apparently body is something easily accessible,
objective, and physically defined. The body seems to be “there”,
possessing an immediate self-evidencing character which does not
need to be explained.
But this is not the case. The body is not a self evident concept,
but the result of the various discourses that construct it.
If the phenomenological experience of the body can appear an
immediate one, the concept of “body” certainly does not. Rather, it
appears to be seen in terms of the construals made of it within any
given disciplinary perspective. In other words, the various meanings
attributed to the notion of body are the sum of the various effects on
sense of the different disciplines as they investigate and define it. The
body as described by neurosciences is not the same body as the one
described by psychoanalysis, or by experimental psychology, and so
on. All these different “bodies” are not reducible to one another ; on
the contrary they produce a quite “heteroclitic” object, not very
different from how language appeared to be when Saussure first
started describing it. Many of the differences in the use of the very
word “embodiment” that I have discussed so far depend on the
different discourses that construct “body” in their respective ways as
an object of research.
To conclude, I would like to point out some possible “zones of
confusions” that appear to be particularly crucial in our current
situation.
The first zone of confusion has already been mentioned, and
concerns the interchangeable use that is sometimes made of the terms
“body” and “brain”. It is important to emphasize once again the
complete lack of coincidence between these two levels : the body can
certainly not be reduced to purely neural forms of activation. A
“body-brain” of this kind would exclude the whole phenomenological
dimension of experience, that live presence that Husserl called Leib,
as opposed to the material Korper.
The second zone of confusion arises in relation to the distinction
between body and corporeal schema. The confusion is more implicit
than explicit, since corporeal schema are rarely mentioned, although
the notion might represent a crucial concept for the discussion of
embodied experience.
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The concept of corporeal schema was first used by psychiatrists
and neurologists towards the end of the nineteenth century, and was
then further elaborated by Paul Schilder in the mid nineteen»-thirties‘.
The corporeal schema is not only the general kinaesthetic
experience we have of our body, but it is also the spatial dimension
that is occupied by the body. According to Schilder it is neither a
sensation nor a mental representation, but something intermediate
between these two things. Merleau-Ponty2 refers to the notion of
corporeal schema in order to define the ‘corps propre’ and its
relationship with subjectivity. According to Merleau-Ponty the notion
has a gestalt configuration and a dynamic character, implying an
intentional dimension. The body is always endowed with a project in
the world; it has its own goals deriving from its interactions with the
environment.
The notion of corporeal schema seems crucial if we wish to
investigate the embodied grounding of concepts, since at that level
what is at stake is not the “body” as a material and natural object, but
its schematic configuration, as has been well demonstrated in studies
on spatialisation in language.
Finally, the third zone of confusion is regarding the relationship
between body and subject. Confusion is probably not the right word
here : “silence” would probably be a more appropriate one, since the
question of subject and subjectivity is almost completely absent in
North American work on embodiment. Why then use the word
“confusion” ? Well, this is because in several cases we can quite
easily find implicit reference to something that we more appropriately
would have referred to as subjectivity, but which is not always
recognized as such. "
Let us take as an example the very interesting article by Mac
Whinney3, where the author analyses some of the different forms in
which language emerges from embodiment. According to Mac
Whinney “language comprehension and production are embodied
processes whose goal is the creation and extraction of embodied
I P. SCHILDER, The Image and Appearance of the Human Body, New York,
International Universities Press, 1935.
2 M. MERLEAU-PONTY, Phénoménologie de la perception, Paris, Gallimard, 1945.
3 B. MAC WHINNEY, “The Emergence of Language from Embodiment”, in B. MAC
WHINNEY (ed.), The Emergence of Language, New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum,
l999.
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meanings (. ..) We can refer to these processes of active embodiment
as the perspective-taken system”‘.
The embodied perspectival systems operating in language are
related to four levels : l) affordances, where language and cognition
are related to individual objects and actions through affordances ; 2)
spatio-temporal reference frames, which refer to “the set of competing
spatio-temporal reference frames”2; 3) causal action chains, most
centrally involved in the emergence of grammar and the different
perspectives of nominative-accusative language or ergative-absolutive
language ; 4) social roles, where the perspectival system allows us “to
adopt the social and cognitive perspectives of other human beings”3.
What is of interest here is that all of these systems are not
equivalent in their relations to the issues of embodiment and
subjectivity.
If the first level of affordances is certainly linked to the body and
its grounding in the linguistic perspectival system, since all the
properties we can think of in relation to an object are affordances
grounded in the perspective of our own body, the same does not hold
for the other three levels, where it is not so much the body that plays a
role, but the point of view of the subject as represented in language.
Consider the spatio-temporal reference frames. Mac Whinney
explicitly mentions three alternative frames, an object-centred, a
speaker-centred, and an environment-centred frame. These frames do
not depend on the body, but on the way the position or perspective of
the subject is framed within discourse. The same is true for the other
two systems: both the perspective a given grammatical construction
imposes on the action, and the perspective connected to interpersonal
and social frames, refer to subjectivity more than to embodiment.
What we have in these cases are traces left at sentence level by the
process of enunciation. The notion of perspective can be framed in the
wider issue of linguistic subjectivity, which, in European post-
saussurian linguistics, has most convincingly been elaborated in the
Theory of Enunciation4. Such a theory unifies in one and the same
I Ib1'd., p. 214.
2 rm, p.215.
3 rim, p.216.
4 E. BENVENISTE, Problémes de linguistique générale I, Paris, Gallimard, 1966 (tr. it.
Problemi di lingzristica generale, Milano, il Saggiatore, 1971) ; IDEM, Problemes de
linguistique générale H, Paris, Gallimard, 1974 (tr. it. Problemi di lingaistica
generale, Milano, il Saggiatore, 1985).
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framework a family of heavily interconnected issues, ranging from
pronominal, temporal and spatial reference systems, to focalization,
perspective, point of view, and so on.
So obviously the question is not whether or not we use
enunciation theory as formulated in post-saussurian linguistics, but
the possible overlappings that may be found between two different
issues, both of which are extremely important, but which are not
necessarily connected with. one another. Perspectival systems depend
on the presence in every sentence of an uncancellable point of view
which is the trace of the enunciation process, and this is something
quite different to embodiment, which is the existence, in both
meaning and in language, of motivated configurations, all of which
depend on embodied experience.
Given the extent to which these two issues are nor the same, the
theory of enunciation removes the issue of embodiment altogether,
leaving only reference to a transcendental subject, completely
deprived of any form of bodily qualification, gender difference or any
other dimension which might be linked to individual subjects‘.
Here we have a deeply paradoxical chiasmus : on the one hand
there is a theory of embodiment without the subject, on the other a
theory of the subject without a body. To finally achieve a bringing
together of body and subject might well be the most challenging goal
of all for a cognitive semiotics to be.
1 Cf. P. VIOLI, L’infiniro singolare. Considerazioni sulla dzﬂferenza sessnale nel
linguoggio, Verona, Essedue, 1986.
